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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
The contention of the defendant in the principal case is that since the
statute abolishing tenancy by the curtesy gives the widower the same right
in real estate as his wife would have had in his estate, and since the wife's
right cannot be affected by a conveyance of the husband alone, R. S. Mo.
(1929) sec. 318, it necessarily follows that the husband's right cannot be
prejudiced by a conveyance of the wife alone. To hold otherwise would be
to assert in the wife a greater estate in the husband's realty than he would
have in the wife's realty. But the court held that the only effect of the
statute was to change the character and quantum of" interest a husband
takes in the lands which his wife owned at the date of her death, and that
it does not attempt to modify or take away the right given a married
woman by the Married Woman's Act to dispose of the whole title to her
separate real estate without joinder of her husband in the deed of con-
veyance. But the Married Woman's Act did not expressly give the right
to the wife to convey her property without joinder. Brook v. Barker, above.
The net effect, therefore, is that the decision in the principal case is reached
by building an assumption on an assumption.
Kentucky, Iowa and Illinois have statutes similar to the one here in
issue. Combs v. Ezell (Ky. 1930) 24 S. W. (2d) 301, holds that the hus-
band's joinder is necessary, but the decision is predicated upon an express
statute to that effect. Ky. Stat. (Carroll, 1922) sec. 2128. In Illinois, the
issue is settled also by an additional statute requiring such joinder. R. S.
Ill. (Cahill, 1929) c. 41 sec. 16. In Iowa the point does not seem to have
been settled by an adjudicated case. H. K. M., '33.
TRADEMARKs-ASSIGNAaILITY-NECESSITY OF DISCLOSURE OF SECRET PROC-
Ess.-The question of whether the assignment of a trademark is valid
when the secret process of manufacture is not also assigned was decided
for the first time in this country in Mulhens & Kropff, Inc. v. Ferd. Muel-
hens, Inc. (C. C. A. 2, 1930) 43 F. (2d) 937, rev'g (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1929)
38 F. (2d) 287; motion to make more specific denied (C. C. A. 2, 1931) 48
F. (2d) 206; certiorari denied (1931) 51 S. Ct. 84.
Kropff and Ferd. Muelhens had been partners in selling in this country
products manufactured by Muelhens in Germany, in accordance with a
secret recipe known only to Muelhens, and sold under the trademark
"4711." A dissolution of the partnership was occasioned by the World
War, and the Alien Property Custodian, under authority of the Trading
With the Enemy Act [40 Stat. 411 (1917) 50 U. S. C. A. sec. 30, 6] sold the
interest of Ferd. Muelhens to Kropff, who manufactured very similar
products under the old name of Mulhens & Kropff, now a corporation, and
sold them under the mark "4711" with the statement that they were made
according to the secret process. After the War, Ferd. Muelhens, Inc., was
organized as selling agent of the German house, and it, too, sold its products
in this country under the mark "4711," advertising Mulhens & Kropff's
claim to the formula to be false. In an action by Mulhens & Kropff, Inc.,
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to restrain the use of the mark, it was held by the Court of Appeals, re-
versing the District Court, that the assignment was not valid as to those
products previously manufactured according to the secret recipe.
Courts have repeatedly held that a trademark is not assignable in gross.
Kidd v. Johnson (1879) 100 U. S. 617; Bulte v. Igleheart Bros. (C. C. A. 7,
1905) 137 F. 492; Spiegel v. Zuckerman (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1910) 175 F.
978. The reason is that a trademark has no existence apart from the
business and good will to which it is appurtenant. Kidd v. Johnson, above;
Storm Waterproofing Corp. v. L. Sonneborn Sons, Inc. (D. C. Del. 1929) 31
F. (2d) 992. The present case in effect extends the doctrine to hold that
where a secret recipe has played an important part in building a business,
the recipe is a necessary part of the good will. This is in line with an
English decision in a very similar case. Le Couturier v. Rey (1910) A. C.
262.
In some instances the function of a trademark has been held to be that
of identifying the origin or ownership or place of manufacture or sale of
the product to which it is attached. Hanover Mill Co. v. Metcalf (1916) 240
U. S. 403. Apparently the District Court granted the injunction on this
theory, stating that the petitioners were known as selling agents of "4711"
products and that it was no deception for them to sell similar products
under the mark so long as they abandoned false advertising. The Court
of Appeals pointed out, however, that the mark indicated something more
than place of origin. It indicated also manufacture according to the secret
process. The use of the mark in this sense was barred to the petitioners.
The recipe had not been passed to them. It was not part of the partnership
assets, but belonged solely to the German house of Ferd. Muelhens, Inc. In
deciding which meaning of the mark was the more significant, the court
held that its use in the second sense would the more adequately protect the
public from deception and insure its obtaining the product it thought it
was buying. W. E. S., '33.
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